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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ness, and pure hearsay, in which case the record is based on informa-
tion received from one disconnected from the business, it is obvious
that the decision in Johnson v. Lutz 15 represents an interpreta-
tion warranted by the terms of the statute and the underlying
theory of circumstantial trustworthiness. It is submitted that, by
limiting the provision that "the lack of personal knowledge by entrant
or maker will not affect admissibility," with the requirement that "the
entry must be made by one in the regular course of his business," the
Court has in effect decreed that personal knowledge must exist at the
source of the transaction by one in the regular course of his business,
regardless of hearsay in the regular course of business at any other
stage.1'
While such a requirement will apply as well to a complicated
system of entries, it is more obvious, due to the simplified -procedure,
in the case of a casual entry represented by a police blotter. Practi-
cally applied, it will simply be necessary to show the usual custom
by which an entry was received, without producing the vaious per-
sons who contributed to the making of it; and then, in order to show
that it was not received in the regular course of business, it will be
necessary for the objecting party to prove that the entry sought to be
admitted was founded on pure hearsay, as distinguished from hearsay
in the regular course of business.
DOROTHY SLAYTON.
THE VALIDITY OF A MORTGAGE CREATED AS A GIFT.
I
"There is perhaps no species of ownership known to law which
is more complex or which has given rise to more diversity of opinions
and even conflict in decisions than which sprung from the mortgage
of Real Property." 1 Thus when we consider our problem, which
involves but one phase of a single planet in the great universe of
mortgage law, it becomes less strange, more feasible and even to be
expected that it too should have become part of the chaos. Our in-
quiry is: Can one create a mortgage by way of gift in New York
today? The aspect we shall consider is the situation as between the
mortgagor and mortgagee. Enlightenment will best be attained by
tracing the history of the mortgage instrument, which in itself has
' Supra Note 2.
See opinion by Mr. Justice Byrne in Kane v. City of New York (Spec.
Tr. Kings Co., N. Y. L. J., April 4, 1930).
'Barrett v. Hinkly, 124 Ill. 32, 14 N. E. 863 (1883).
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developed under exceedingly varied circumstances. The problem sug-
gests three subdivisions:
Is it essential to the existence of a binding mortgage that
it be created as a security?
Is a mortgage in itself a grant?
Does a mortgage require consideration?
The first intimation of a mortgage apparently is in the Hebrew
Law,2 under which land could be alienated to secure a debt until the
termination of the next jubilee, which occurred at the end of every
fifty years, but the original owner was allowed to redeem before the
jubilee on payment of a certain sum.3
It is suggested by Thomas that the Romans borrowed the idea
of mortgage from the Hebrews. 4 The fiducia was the first attempt
at a mortgage in Rome. The borrower (mortgagor) executed an
actual conveyance of 'property to the lender (mortgagee) upon an
agreement known as a fiducia, stating that if the loan was paid at the
time specified that lender would reconvey the property to the bor-
rower. The lender thus was in a position to sell at any time leaving
the borrower only a personal action against him. This was realized
as unsatisfactory and led to the next form of mortgage known to the
Romans, the pignus. By this instrument, title remained in the debtor
(mortgagor) and so if the creditor (mortgagee) endeavored to sell
the property, the debtor having retained title could recover it from
the vendee.
The result of the final development of the Roman mortgage was
the most perfect of all the preceding undertakings, insofar as it por-
trayed and effectuated the true intent of the parties. This was called
the hypotlwca. No title passed to the creditor (mortgagee) and on
default no forfeiture took place but the laiter had the right to sell
the property, retain the sum of the debt and his expenses and return
the surplus to the debtor (mortgagor).5 In this form of instrument,
it is contended, is the origin of the English notion of the equitable
theory of the mortgage.
Mortgages were next known among the Anglo-Saxons in
England. After the Norman Conquest feudalism prevailed; free
alienation of property was suspended and thus the mortgage instru-
ment was temporarily out of use. However, when, during the reign
of Edward the First, the statute Quia Emptores Terrarum was
passed, unrestrained disposition of land again was common and
with the restriction which impeded the conveyance of land removed,
mortgages again came into general use.6
'Thomas, Mortgages (3rd Ed. 1914), Sec. 1.
'Ibid. citing Neb. 5, 1-7.
'Ibid. Sec. 2.
' Burdick, Real Prioperty (1914), Sec. 183.
'Supra Note 2, Sec. 3; Burdick, mipra Note 5.
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Under the early English law two kinds of land securities were
recognized:
1. Vivurm vadium, meaning live pledge: Here the rents
and profits of the land were received by the mortgagee in
possession and applied to the reduction of the debt and so the
pledge redeemed itself.
2. Mortuum vadium, meaning dead pledge: In this case
the rents and profits we're kept by the mortgagee in possession
and not applied towards the payment of the debt.
Both of the above were determinable or base fees with the right
of reverter in the feoffor (mortgagor) upon the pertormance of the
condition. In the vimmin vadium the feoffor (mortgagor) could al-
ways redeem, even after default; in the mortuum vdium title and
all interest in the estate became vested in the feoffee (mortgagee) if
the condition was not punctually performed.7
Vivum vadium never went into general use and there is no trace
of the date of its complete disappearance.8 iMortuum vadium is the
source from which the modern mortgage emerged. Littleton claimed
the reason for the application of the term mwrtuum vadium to this
mortgage instrument was because it was doubtful whether the feoffor
(mortgagor) would pay on the day limited, and if he should not pay,
the land which was put in pledge on condition for payment of the
money, was taken from him forever and so dead to him. Granville's
theory is that an earlier form of the same security existed by which
rents were received by the creditor in lieu of his interest, the land
thus becoming for a time dead to the debtor.'
The common law mortgage in England was a feoffment subject
to a condition that on payment by the feoffor (mortgagor) of a named
sum at a certain time he might re-enter, thereby terminating the
feoffee's (mortgagee's) fee. 10 Rigid performance of the condition
of the common law mortgage was demanded by the courts of law,
who refused to consider that the conveyance was intended merely as
security for a debt and they treated the estate of the mortgagee as
indefeasible if the condition was not promptly complied with by the
mortgagor. Since the estate was usually much greater than the debt
this resulted in a very harsh practice. But the common law courts
were acquainted with no other means or manner of regarding debtors
than to make them live up to their bargains, however unfair they
might be.' Courts of Chancery, influenced by the Roman Law,
Burdick. supra Note 5; Thomas, supra Note 2, Sec. 4.
'Supra Note 2, Sec. 4.
Ibid. Sec. 6 (According to Thomas, Littleton believed in strict compliance
and forfeiture; he was followed by Blackstone. Granville's theory was en-
dorsed by Coote and Williams).
:03 Tiffany, Real Property (2nd Ed. 1920), Sec. 599.
'Ibid., citing Kenfs Com. 140; also sapra Note 2, Sec. 6.
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tempered the severity with which the common law courts enforced
the breach of condition. Thomas states that they accomplished their
end, "not by declaring that the force of the conveyance after forfei-
ture and before foreclosure ceases on the payment of the debt for
which it was given to secure, but they merely allowed forfeiture to
take place and then acting in personamn declared it unreasonable for
the creditor to retain permanently what was intended as a mere
pledge." 12 The equity of redemption was incident to this remedy.
If, however, the mortgagor did not redeem and the mortgagee sold
the property, Chancery would no doubt allow the mortgagee to retain
what was due him and force him to return the balance to the mort-
gagor. In result, it was not unlike the Roman hypotheca.
Later, Chancery, regarding the real purpose of the transaction,
adopted the view that the mortgagor in spite of his conveyance by
way of mortgage still remained owner of the property with all the
rights of an owner so far as consistent with the security of the mort-
gagee, and that the mortgagee had for most purposes merely a lien
or charge on the land to secure his debt.' 3 Though title still passed
to the mortgagee, inasmuch as the legal rights of the mortgagee could
only be used to enforce payment of the debt which the mortgage
secured, the mortgagee could not be regarded as the owner of the
estate, and courts of law later realized that such is not the true con-
dition. Chancellor Kent speaks of this step thus: "One of the most
splendid instances of our jurisprudence is the triumph of equitable
principles over technical rules and the homage which these principles
have received by their adoption in courts of law." 14
Preceding the colonization of this country in 1600 it was still
understood in England that a mortgage of any kind vested the fee in
the mortgagee. And when the English settled here, they brought
with them this common law aspect of the mortgage which existed in
England. 15 It was not until after the Revolution that the question
of the effect of the mortgage instrument appears to have been raised
directly; about that time efforts were made to enforce the mortgage
in Massachusetts and Trowbridge, J., decided the question in his
"Pleading."' 16 There he stated that the mortgagee was the legal
owner of the fee while the mortgagor had an equitable estate only, so
that the mortgagee could get possession even before breach of condi-
tion unless the right was expressly reserved in the mortgagor. This
purported to give an estate to the mortgagee rather than a lien.
However, in New York we find a different situation. "It has
long been settled," Tiffany states, "both at law and equity in New
York that the mortgagor remains the owner of the fee and the mort-
gage is a mere security."'17 Many of the states of the Union have
= Supra Note 2, Sec. 8.
Supra Note 10, Sec. 600.
4 Kent's Corn. 158.
"
tUnion National Bank of Col. v. Cook, 110 S. C. 99, 96 S. E. 485 (1918).
"a Supra Note 2, Sec. 23. citing Trovbridge's Pleading, 2 Mfass. 551.
1Tiffany, Treatise on Real Property, See. 507 (1912).
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adopted the lien theory of the mortgage now prevalent in New
York,'8 either by means of express statutes declaring a mortgage to
be a security or by a series of decisions or both. 19 But even the
states which adopted the theory that title passes to the mortgagee,
now regard the title merely as an additional right whereby he may
secure his debt.20
Today, to constitute a mortgage, only two things appear to be
necessary: that there be a grant, and that the grant be given to secure
the performance of an obligation or a valid claim. 21  "No conveyance
can be a mortgage unless it is made for the purpose of securing the
payment of a debt or the performance of a duty, either existing at
the time the conveyance is made or to be created or to arise in the
future.122  The answer to the first question, "Is it essential to the
existence of a binding mortgage that it be created as a security?"
seems necessarily to be in the affirmative.
' Supra Note 16, citing Sexton v. Breese, 135 N. Y. 387, 32 N. E. 133
(1892); Power v. Lester, 23 N. Y. 527 (1861); Kortright v. Cady, 21 N. Y.
343 (1860); Runyon v. Mersereau, 11 Johns. 534 (1814), Revised Statutes
1828 (1st Ed. R. S. N. Y.), Vol. I, Sec. 2 (Different sets of books shall be
kept for recording deeds and mortgages; in one of which sets all conveyances
absolute in terms and not intended as mortgages shall be recorded and in the
other such mortgages and securities shall be recorded), Vol. II, Sec. 57(provides that no action in ejectment shall hereafter be maintained for recovery
of mortgaged property by the mortgagee) ; Sec. 139 [now Sec. 249 R. P. L.1
(No mortgage shall be considered as implying a covenant for the payment of
the sum intended to be secured and where there shall be no express covenant
for such payment, contained in the mortgage and no bond or other separate
instrument to secure such payment shall have been given, the remedies of the
mortgagee shall be confined to the lands mentioned).
Murray v. Walker, 31 N. Y. 399 (1860) (held that legal title is in the
mortgagee, but in equity the mortgagor remains the owner until foreclosure) ;
Trim v. Marsh, 54 N. Y. 599 (1874) (legal title and possession both remain in
the mortgagor until foreclosure).
Tiffany, mtpra Note 17. In New York, the view that the mortgagee has
legal title is entirely superseded at law and in equity by the view which always
prevailed in equity, that the mortgagee has merely a lien for security of
his debt.
1 Lien Theory: California, C. P. A., Sec. 260 (declares that a mortgage is
to be regarded as a lien for the purpose of security and not as a conveyance on
a condition subsequent); Nevada also has a statute to the same effect, passed
in 1896; Cawley v. Kelly, 60 Wisc. 315, 19 N. W. 65 (1884) ; Devlin v. Quigg,
44 Minn. 534, 47 N. W. 258 (1890); Gassert v. Borgk, 7 Mont. 585, 19 Pac.
281 (1888) ; South Carolina by statute (1791).
'Legal Title Theory: Wilkins v. French, 20 Me. 111 (1841); Mitchell v.
Burnheim, 44 Me. 286, Ludden 2 (1857); Tyler v. Wright, 122 Me. 558. 119
Atl. 583 (1923) ; Glass v. Ellison, 9 N. H. 69 (1837) ; Bethlehem v. Annis, 40
N. H. 34 (1860); Hall v. Byrne, 2 Ill. 140 (1834); Erskine v. Townsend, 2
Mass. 493, L. R. A. 1916 B (1807); Norcross v. Norcross, 105 Mass.
265 (1870).
"Burnett v. Wright, 135 N. Y. 543, 32 N. E. 253 (1892); Gassert v.
Borgk, 7 Mont. 585, 19 Pac. 281 (1888).




Is a mortgage in itself a grant? Tiffany states that a legal mort-
gage even when regarded merely as a lien is not an executory contract
since it does not in itself involve any personal obligation.23 That a
mortgage is an executed instrument seems to be the correct view.
Ownership is defined as the right by which a thing belongs to some
one in particular to the exclusion of all others. 24 But it may be com-
plete (perfect) or incomplete (imperfect). It is complete (perfect)
when the thing owned is unencumbered with any real right toward
any person other than the owner. It is incomplete (imperfect) when
the thing is charged with a real right in a third person. Applying
ownership thus classified to the mortgage instrument we find a crea-
tion of rights in the mortgagee (regardless of whether he received
title or merely a lien to secure his debt) and that the mortgagor's
ownership has become incomplete (imperfect) because encumbered
by real rights in a third party. The mortgagee has in effect a present
right to protect himself against the possible non-performance of the
condition of non-payment of the obligation which the instrument is
intended to secure. This right is assignable, conveyable and devis-
able. Thus when a mortgage is executed to a mortgagee he is en-
dowed with a grant of rights in real property. Arguing from the
conclusion that an antecedent debt is sufficient consideration to sup-
port a mortgage what peculiar position would we be in if we also
declared that a mortgage is executory in nature?
III
Is consideration necessary to the validity of the mortgage itself?
It is most important, that in considering this question, we distinguish
the mortgage instrument itself from the obligations which it secures,
for at the moment we are referring to the former only. The topic
of consideration was never introduced in the Roman form of mort-
gage for the reason that consideration was never required to support
any contract or other instrument, either under the Ancient Roman
Law or under the Civil Law,25 motive, or the presence of an inducing
cause to the promisor being all that was required. Regarding the
mortgage from a purely common-law view as a conveyance on a con-
dition subsequent, such conveyance is perfectly valid without considera-
tion, as would be an absolute deed. Contemplating the mortgage from
the equitable point of view, as a grant of a security for the perform-
ance of an obligation there is no apparent reason for the introduction
of the doctrine of consideration, for a grant is an executed instrument
and consideration is applicable only to executory contracts. 26 That,
' Supra Note 10, Sec. 606.
Black's Law Dictionary (2nd Ed.), 866.
1 Williston on Contracts, 230, Sec. 111.
Sipra Note 23.
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consideration is not necessary to the validity of a mortgage itself
would seem evident from the fact that a mortgage is valid though
given to secure the payment of a pre-existing debt, 27 or to secure
advances which the mortgagee may voluntarily make in the future.2 8
Confusion relative to the necessity for consideration in a mort-
gage arises, no doubt, from a failure to distinguish between the thing
(debt or obligation) secured and the term consideration. "The idea
that consideration is the price requested and received by the promisor
for the promise is the generally accepted one at present time." 29
Also it has been defined as a detriment incurred by the promisee or a
benefit received by the promisor for his promise.30 If the considera-
tion is an.act done before the contract is made, it is really by itself
no consideration for a new contract. A past indebtedness is un-
doubtedly a past consideration and therefore cannot be regarded as
consideration within the meaning of the term.31 It cannot be said
that anything is being parted with by the mortgagee or that any
benefit is being conferred upon the mortgagor, when a mortgage is
executed to secure an antecedent debt. When the courts state that
past indebtedness is sufficient consideration to support a mortgage,
what they really mean is that it is sufficient that a debt is in existence
for the mortgage to secure.
Though consideration is not necessary to the validity of the
mortgage itself, the question whether the obligation secured is sup-
ported by consideration is material, "since a mortgage is in the view
at least of a court of equity a nullity except insofar as it secures a
valid claim or obligation." 3 2  And if the mortgage secures a con-
tractual obligation which is not under seal the obligation must be
supported by consideration. A seal is merely presumptive evidence
of consideration for an executory contract in New York and since
the presumption may be rebutted the seal itself can hardly be consid-
ered as sufficient consideration for the obligation.33  It has been held
that a mortgage was invalid, not because it was not supported by
consideration, but because the obligation it secured was not so sup-
ported.3 4  By statute in this state,3 5 no covenant of personal obliga-
tion is necessary to the validity of a mortgage and where it is lacking
' Lehrenkrauss v. Bonnell, 199 N. Y. 240, 92 N. E. 637 (1910) ; DeLancey
v. Stearns, 66 N. Y. 157 (1876).
'Rice v. Groves, 70 Hun 74, 25 N. Y. Supp. 36 (1893) ; Bank v. Kemp,
21 Cal. App. 571, 132 Pac 617 (1913).
' Supra Note 25 at 193, Sec. 100.
'Supra Note 24, citing Anson, Contracts, Sec. 2.
' Supra Note 29.
"Tyler v. Wright, 122 Me. 558, 119 Atl. 583 (1923).
3'N. Y. C. P. A. 342.
, Chesser v. Chesser, 67 Fla. 16, 64 So. 357 (1914) ; Anderson v. Lee, 73
Minn. 384, 76 N. W. 24 (1898); Saunders v. Dunn, 175 Mass. 104, 55 N. E.
893 (1900).
'N. Y. R. P. L. 249.
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the debt is enforceable against the land, and this does not obviate the
necessity for a debt or thing to be secured. It is submitted that the
term "personal liability" would have been less misleading than the
term "personal obligation" used in the statute.
Tiffany contends that even apart from the necessity of considera-
tion for the personal obligation secured, it is settled that a mortgage
purporting to secure the payment of money will be enforced only to
the extent of the sum equitably due without reference to amount
named in the mortgage instrument or bond or note accompanying it.36
From this statement it appears that upon foreclosure equity would
insist upon knowing precisely how much the mortgagor owes the
mortgagee and if it should be found that there was no debt how
could equity grant foreclosure to pay a debt which did not exist?
IV
Finally we are in a position to treat the principal problem
directly, "Can one create a binding mortgage by way of gift?" In
Tiffany's Treatise published in 1912 37 it is stated that, except as
against creditors who may be defrauded thereby, a mortgage securing
in terms the payment of a sum of money is valid though the mort-
gagor received no part of such sum or any other consideration for
making the mortgage; the owner of the land having the same right to
make a present of a mortgage on land as to give the land itself and
that it would be enforced according to its terms. We will touch the
cases he cited to substantiate his statement and also a few additional
cases declaring that a mortgage may be given as a gift and then refer
to the same author's view on this point taken from a writing of a
later date.
In Calhoun v. Calhoun 3 land was conveyed to defendant by
his parents. He then executed a mortgage to them, one of whom is
the plaintiff, to secure the provisions assuring their support for their
respective lives. The Court said: "It is immaterial whether the de-
fendant assumed such obligation wholly in payment for the land con-
veyed to him, or partly in payment of the conveyance and partly for
love and affection-either or both would be sufficient." It is clear
that there was consideration for the obligation which the mortgage
was given to secure in this case. Nevertheless this case is freely
cited as one which has held that love and affection is sufficient to
support a mortgage.
In Gates v. Seagraves 3 9 "A" deeded property to her daughter,
expressing her wish to reserve a benefit to her husband. In considera-
tion of the conveyance the daughter executed a mortgage to her
- Supra Note 23.
'T Supra Note 17, Sec. 513.
'49 App. Div. 520, 63 N. Y. Supp. 601 (1900) ; Bachmeier v. Bachmeier,
69 Minn. 472, 72 N. W. 710 (1897).
" 56 Ind. App. 486, 105 N. E. 594 (1907).
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ftther according to "A's" request. It is apparent that the mortgage
was not voluntary.
In Bucklin v. Bucklin 40 to compromise a controversy between
husband and wife and to stay prosecution of a suit instituted by the
latter for legal separation, the former promised to buy property and
grant it to wife and child and to secure such promise, executed a
mortgage for their benefit. It is obvious that since the action was
stayed there was consideration for the promise to convey, therefore
the mortgage secured a valid promise and Judge Denio's language to
the effect that a mortgage may be given as a gift is dicta.
Brigham v. Brown 41 states by way of dictum the following:
"A man may give a voluntary mortgage if he chooses and it is fraudu-
lent only as to those who are or would be defrauded thereby." In
this case Justice Cooley cites Gale v. Gould 42 as authority, which
holds merely that a deed may be given by way of gift.
In Campbell v. Tompkins 43 it is stated also as dicta that "It
cannot be doubted that even now a valid mortgage may be given
where no valuable consideration exists. Otherwise absolute control
of the owner over his property is taken away for he would not be
permitted to give it away in his life-time by deed. A mortgage may
be sustained as against all except creditors whose claims existed at
the time of giving it, though it was intended merely as a gift; and
when executed and delivered it is as valid as if it were based on a full
consideration and is not open to the objection that it is a voluntary
executory agreement but may be enforced according to its terms as
an executed conditional transfer of the real estate mortgaged." No
doubt the Court had in mind a situation where a third party challenged
the validity of the mortgage which third party was unable to show
that he was defrauded by the execution of said mortgage. If, on the
other hand, the situation as between the mortgagor and mortgagee
was contemplated then it is agreed that the mortgagor could not
resist enforcement of the mortgage by saying "it is a voluntary execu-
tory agreement" and therefore the mortgage is effective: but he could
probably be sustained on the defense that there was nothing to secure
(or that the thing secured was without consideration) and therefore
there could be no binding mortgage.
Perkins v. Trinity 44 has gone further by way of dicta than all
the preceding cases to say that a mortgage may be given by way of
gift. The Court, in effect, repeats what has above been stated in
Campbell v. Tompkins 45 and then proceeds with this declaration:
"The mortgage itself is an executed conveyance, defeasible on the
carrying out of an executory contract. This executory contract is
' I Abb. App. Cases 242 (1864).
" 44 Mich. 59, 6 N. W. 97 (1880).
12-40 Mich. 515 (1879) (also cited by Jones).
"32 N. J. Eq. 170 (1880).
" 69 N. J. Eq. 723, 61 Atl. 167 (1905).
, Supra Note 43.
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subject to all the laws applicable to contracts and must, of course, be
supported by consideration. That consideration need not move to
the mortgagor and the debt to secure which the mortgage is given
may be the debt of another person. But this does not militate against
the necessity of finding in each instance (excepting where the ques-
tion is one of gift) that there was an executory contract on considera-
tion to secure which the executed defeasible conveyance was made."
The meaning of the Court is not at all clear. If it was meant that a
mortgage, if given as a gift, would not necessarily have to secure
anything, it is not plain how it could be created. One of the elements
of a mortgage being that the conveyance be given to secure a valid
obligation, it is apparent that if we omit the thing secured we vill be
omitting one of the essentials of the mortgage instrument. If he
intended that the existence of the thing secured or its validity would
not be open to question in the case of a gift, he would be declaring
the mortgage given as a gift an exception.
Tiffany 46 in his work on Real Property, written in 1920, eight
years after his treatise mentioned above, speaks thus on the issue of a
mortgage by way of gift: "Occasional decisions (citing the Campbell
and Brigham cases) to the effect that one may make a gift by execut-
ing a mortgage in favor of a donee for a named amount, is open to
serious question, except insofar, at least, as a personal obligation
under seal for that amount is also given. There is in such case
merely a mortgage purporting to secure a debt which debt doesn't
exist * * *. According to common law standards it would seem
that a sealed obligation to the obligee would be valid in which case a
mortgage securing such obligation would also be valid and effective."
He states further that a mortgage is valid only if it secures a valid
claim or obligation but that there need be no personal liability on the
part of the mortgagor.47 In Tyler v. Wright 48 it was said: "Since a
conveyance cannot be a mortgage unless given to secure the perform-
ance of an obligation, the existence of an obligation to be secured is
an essential element, without which the mortgage is but a shadow
without the substance."
If we concede that in itself a mortgage does not require con-
sideration, and also that it is in itself a grant, the logical conclusion
would seem to be that it may be created by way of gift. Yet the
grant is one given as security. The inquiry follows what may this
grant secure, so that it may be enforced as a mortgage in New York?
"It is not every conveyance of land on condition which is in equity
"Supra Note 10, Sec. 607.
" Mooney v. Byrne, 163 N. Y. 86, 57 N,. E. 103 (1900) ; Baird v. Baird,
145 N. Y. 659, 40 N. E. 222 (1895) ; Hill v. Hoole, 116 N. Y. 299, 22 N. E.
547 (1889) ; Tyler v. Wright, supra Note 32 (where it was held, as in Baird
v. Baird and Hill v. Hoole, that since no obligation existed to be secured, no
mortgage could exist). But in all of these cases it was also found that no
intention to create a mortgage existed.
"Supra Note 32.
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regarded as a mortgage. Early definitions of mortgages are found
where no other conditional conveyances are regarded as mortgages
but such as are made for the security of a loan of money. At an-
other date we find equitable doctrines as to mortgages extended to all
cases where the conveyance is security for any debt; and the most
modern notion is to apply the same doctrines to cases generally where
conditional deeds are made as a security for the performance of a
contract. But on consideration it will be seen that this principle
though generally true can have no application to any other contract
than such as by the non-performance create a debt, or a demand in
the nature of a debt against the delinquent party." 4 9 Although the
contractual obligation must exist or the debt must be present, the
personal liability (as evidenced by a covenant, bond, note, etc.) under
either, which personal liability gives the one who seeks to enforce the
obligation the power to do so (as against the person) may be lacking.
Should said personal liability be absent or become ineffectual because
of some statute, the contractual obligation would not also vanish, but
on the contrary persist; merely the remedy against the person
would cease.
Under the New York statute 50 if the personal liability on the
obligation is not present, none shall be implied but the debt or obliga-
tion which the mortgage was given to secure shall be enforceable
against the land only. The distinction between the personal liability
under the obligation and the obligation itself must be kept in mind.
We are permitted by statute to dispense with the former, but not
with the latter.
Under the Roman law, creating the mortgage as a gift never
became an issue, for the obligation did not require consideration and
still does not under the civil law.
Under the common law, a mortgage not being recognized as a
security, but considered as a conveyance on condition subsequent,
there was no need to look for a valid obligation to be secured.
But under the law as it exists in New York today, where the
mortgage is regarded as security and must secure a valid claim or
obligation the obligation, being governed by the law of contracts,
must have a valuable present consideration to support it. The final
deduction, therefore, seems to be that a binding mortgage could not
be created as a gift.
In Baird v. Baird, Hill v. Hoole and Tyler v. Wright, 51 in
which it was held that no mortgage existed because there was no
debt or obligation to be secured, there was also an additional circum-
stance present, namely, no intent to create a valid mortgage. What
will the courts say if the intent of the mortgagor and mortgagee to
create a binding mortgage is clear. Will Equity disregard the neces-
sity for an obligation and consider it more equitable to enforce the
" Bethlehem v. Annis, 40 N. H. 34 (1860).
N. Y. R. P. L., Sec. 249.
" Supra Note 47.
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instrument according to its tenor? If the parties clearly state their
intent to execute a mortgage to secure the performance of an obliga-
tion, contemplated and understood by both parties to be a gift, it
would seem just to enforce it. If the mortgagee in such case had
surrendered a peppercorn at the request of the mortgagor we do not
doubt that it would be enforceable, yet if their intent is very apparent
but the peppercorn is not surrendered, it is very uncertain whether it
would be enforceable against the mortgagor. Specific intention,
heretofore apparently not a controlling factor in arriving at the
decision, may at some future time be the basis for a different result.
EDITH SCHAFFER.
